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This paper describes and assesses the ﬂow of ‘Greek semantics’, i.e. the study
of semantic phenomena in the grammar of Greek, and of its syntax-seman-
tics interface. Semantic studies of Greek started appearing in the late 1970’s
and early 1980’s, and have been quite plentiful since then, with a well-de-
ﬁned formal semantic orientation in the 1990’s. The major topics in Greek
semantics are discussed, including mood choice, sentential complemen-
tation, negation and polarity, tense-aspect modality, and ellipsis. Emphasis is
given to how the semantic study of Greek connects to the larger crosslin-
guistic picture; more often than not, the results based on Greek call for
modiﬁcation of existing theories, and are shown to have signiﬁcant theoreti-
cal implications for the overall design of grammar and, especially, the rela-
tion between morphology/syntax and semantics.
1. Prelude: delimiting the paradigm of ‘Greek semantics’
The study of linguistic meaning has long been the privilege of philologists,
philosophers, and logicians, and it is only recently that it acquired the status of
an autonomous research paradigm within modern linguistics. The turn occurs
in the late 1960’s and the beginning of the 1970’s, most notably with the
development of model-theoretic semantics. Through the years, natural language
semantics has blossomed, and it now forms a fruitful paradigm within linguis-
tics with a well-deﬁned repertoire of techniques, which permit the formulation
of theories with a high degree of explanatory adequacy and sophistication.
When we think of meaning in a pre-theoretical way, the ﬁrst thing that
comes to mind is the meaning of words; but semantics is not simply the study
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of the vocabulary. In the framework of modern linguistics, where grammar
describes the internal knowledge of a language (i.e., the linguistic competence
of ﬂuent speakers), semantics is the proper part of grammar whose aim is to
describe their semantic competence. It is the module of grammar that enables
speakers to assign meanings to atomic constituents, to derive complex mean-
ings by combining the meanings of atomic constituents according to certain
rules, and subsequently to understand whether a given combination is mean-
ingful or not. As in every other area of modern linguistics, application of formal
methods in semantics has been essential in attaining the desired degree of
adequacy, precision, and testability in theorizing.
Apart from the integration of formal techniques, three other factors have
contributed to the growth of natural language semantics. First, semantics has
been vitalized by acknowledging the need to capture facets of meaning extend-
ing beyond truth-conditional meaning. This broadening of orientation is
reﬂected in the theories of dynamic semantics, i.e. Dynamic Predicate Logic
(Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991; Chierchia 1995), File Change Semantics (Heim
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1982), and Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp & Reyle 1993), all of
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which, regardless of the varying executions, can be regarded as descending from
Stalnaker’s (1978) dynamic theory of assertion.1 The leading idea is that
5
sentences are not interpreted in isolation, but relevant to some context with the
result of updating that context. A richer notion of meaning is therefore postulat-
ed incorporating features previously thought of as ‘pragmatic’, e.g. context
dependency and change, and presupposition. The gap between semantics and
pragmatics is today smaller than ever.
The second driving force has been adherence to the principle of compositi-
onality. Compositionality postulates that the meaning of a sentence is a function
of the meanings of its constituents and of the way in which they are combined.
This means that semantics is relational: in order to attain the correct interpreta-
tion, a semanticist has to consider the syntactic form as well, to pair syntactic
and semantic structure by assigning meanings to syntactic units, and to
combine these meanings to achieve the desired sentence meaning. From this
pairing the paradigm of the syntax-semantics interface was born.
Finally, the rapidly increasing crosslinguistic orientation has been a major
push forward. Crosslinguistic semantics has given us a number of fascinating
results that have quite often led to a better understanding of a variety of
phenomena, and emphasized the need to reformulate narrow proposals based
on the study of English. Crosslinguistic semantics has also made clear that the
compositionality principle should be retained as the basic principle of semantic
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interpretation, even when we describe languages whose surface structure is
(much) diﬀerent from that of English (for this especially see Bittner 1994).
<LINK "gia-r7">
As the title of this article suggests, the semantic study of Greek will be
viewed as part of the crosslinguistic semantics program. (Following current
practice, I will use “Greek” to refer to Modern Greek, unless indicated other-
wise). Linguistic studies of the semantic phenomena of Greek started appearing
in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s (Newton 1979; Newton & Veloudis 1980a,b;
46">
Veloudis 1979; Christidis 1982), and have been quite plentiful since then. We
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may use ‘Greek semantics’ as a cover term for the whole paradigm. This article,
however, is not meant as a historical overview of the paradigm; rather, the
primary goal is to highlight its major moments, emphasizing the progress that
has been made, and the dynamics of future research. Naturally, the mode of
presentation as well as the particular perspective I adopt could not but reﬂect
my own training and orientation; nonetheless, I have tried to be as careful as I
could in presenting the ﬂow of Greek semantics as a whole in its attempt to
describe and explain the particular characteristics of Greek and how they
connect to the larger crosslinguistic picture.
In most studies in the 1980’s a primary goal was to describe the semantic
phenomena of Greek. This orientation aﬀorded a number of detailed and
insightful descriptions, which have been subsequently embedded into the larger
theoretical picture, especially in the 1990’s. A second characteristic of the earlier
stage, which relates to the descriptive orientation, has been a reluctance to
endorse formal semantic frameworks. As a typical result of this tendency, we
ﬁnd relatively few formal analyses (e.g. Newton 1979; Newton & Veloudis 1980;
and Veloudis 1982), at the time when there is an explosion of formal semantics
abroad— for instance withMontague grammar, generalized quantiﬁer theory,
ﬁle change semantics, tense- and possible world semantics. Instead, Greek
scholars have favored non-formal or purely pragmatic approaches, in certain
circles until today. In the 1990’s formal orientation gained ground; many
current analyses take the earlier descriptive results as their starting point and
cast them in formal semantic frameworks.
Certain topics have been extensively dealt with: sentential complemen-
tation, mood selection, negation, and polarity phenomena — the order here
reﬂects a rough chronological approximation. Other topics have also attracted
interest, e.g. the semantics of aspect, tense, modality, conditionals, (pseu-
do)clefts, and ellipsis. It will be impossible, of course, to consider all these topics
in thorough detail in an article like this one. Mymain focus will be on the most
recurring topics and on those of more current active interest, to the degree they
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are concerned with the syntax-semantics interface within generative grammar.
Before proceeding, let me brieﬂy remark on studies it was not possible to
include in the discussion. There are numerous works on the lexical content of
particles, constructions, andmorphemes by linguists working on lexicography,
sociolinguistics, and pragmatics. I should mention here, merely as indications,
the following: Anastasiadi-Simeonidi (1997) on lexicographical aspects of the
<LINK "gia-r4">
inﬁxes like -aδikos, -atikos, etc.; Kalokerinos (1993, 1998) on concessive expres-
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sions and cardinals respectively; Karatzola (1998) on tulaxiston, ‘at least’, Arhakis
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(1998) on “correctives” like δilaδi ‘that is to say’, m’ala loja ‘in other words’. I
have not been able to consider these and similar works in any detail because to
do so would be to take us deep into the further arena of pragmatics, an area of
which space precludes a thorough investigation. Topics concerning questions
of a more philosophical nature have also been excluded for the same reason.
The discussion proceeds as follows. In Section 2 sentential complemen-
tation and mood selection in complement clauses are considered. In Section 3
I discuss negation and polarity phenomena within the perspective of the syntax-
semantics interface. Finally, in Section 4, I consider (a) tense, aspect modality,
(b) ellipsis, and (c) pseudoclefts. I conclude by emphasizing the main results
and suggesting directions for further research.
2. Sentential complementation and mood selection
Traditionally (inter alia Mackridge 1985; Holton et al. 1997), grammars of
03
Modern Greek distinguish three moods, the indicative, the subjunctive, and the
imperative. The former two, unlike their ancient Greek counterparts, are not
marked morphologically on the verb, but the imperative is indeed marked by a
bound morpheme attached to the verbal stem. Imperatives never occur as
embedded clauses. The subjunctive is marked by preverbal particles, e.g. na, as.
In the absence of such particles or imperative morphology we talk about
indicative mood. Unlike imperatives, indicative and na-sentences may be used
as main or embedded clauses.
It is a well-known property of Greek that it lacks inﬁnitives. Sentential
complements are always ﬁnite and come in three varieties: indicative
oti/pos-complements, pu-complements, and na-complements. Pu clauses may
additionally be characterized as factive (to be discussed in more detail below).
The syntax of mood has been central to the discussion of the Greek clause
structure, but since this article is not about syntax, I will not consider the
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syntactic issues in any detail. Philippaki-Warburton (1985, 1994), and Philip-
<LINK "gia-r50">
paki-Warburton & Veloudis (1984) posit that na is a moodmorpheme generat-
ed in Mood0, rather than a complementizer (Agouraki 1993). The particle θa,
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otherwise indicating the future, can also have subjunctive-like modal uses, e.g.
when construed with the imperfective past form as in θa elega ‘I would (like to)
say that…’ (note that the English future modal has a parallel use); but in general
the subjunctive na and the future modality of θa should be kept apart as distinct
categories (for extensive arguments in favor of this point see Philippaki-
Warburton 1994:308–312).
I assume that a simple Greek embedded clause has (at least) the structure in (1):
(1) [CP {pu/oti/Ø}[MoodP {na/Ø} [T/AgrP {θa/Ø} Verb [VP tverb]]]]
Additional projections might be needed for negation, topicalization, quantiﬁer
movement, focus placement and possibly other operations, but I ignore these
complications here, as they are not relevant to the current discussion. Instead, I
concentrate on the accounts of the semantic parameters regulatingmood choice.
2.1 The issue of factivity
Both oti/pos and pu complements are indicative, but the two complementizers
are not in free variation:
(2) Χρηκα {που / *τι} εδα τον Αντρα.
xarika {pu / *oti} iδa ton andrea
was-glad-1sg {that  saw-1sg the Andreas
‘I was glad that I saw Andreas.’
(3) Eπα {*που /τι} εδα τον Αντρα.
ipa {*pu / oti} iδa ton andrea
said-1sg {that  saw-1sg the Andreas
‘I said that I saw Andreas.’
(4) Θυµθηκα {που /τι} εδα τον Αντρα.
θimiθika {pu / oti} iδa ton andrea
remembered-1sg {that  saw-1sg the Andreas
‘I remembered that I saw Andreas.’
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(5) Ξρω {που /τι} θα εναι στην ταβρνα.
ksero {pu / oti} θa ine stin taverna
know-1sg {that  fut be-3sg in-the taverna
‘I know that he will be at the taverna.’
(Christidis 1982:116)
<LINK "gia-r9">
Emotive factive verbs (also characterized as ‘psychological’ predicates because
they express a psychological attitude of the speaker towards situations which are
perceived as facts) are compatible with pu but not with oti, as we see in (2);
assertive verbs, i.e. verbs like say, report, etc. used by speakers to present their
complements as assertions in reported conversation, exhibit the opposite
pattern in (3). Epistemic verbs express belief-related attitudes, and as we shall
see in the next section, align with assertives. In (4) and (5), ﬁnally, we see that
semi-factives (or, “cognitive factives”, i.e. factives containing an epistemic
component) like θimame ‘remember’ and fully epistemic factive verbs like ksero
‘know’ are compatible with both pu as well as oti/pos.
What determines, then, which complementizer to use? Triandafyllides
(1941:396) states that the complementizer “pu represents something more real
than pos”; Christidis (1982) attempts a more precise characterization of what it
means to be “more real”, by considering Kiparsky and Kiparsky’s (1971)
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hypothesis that factive verbs presuppose the truth of their complement. This
analysis is summarized in (6), where “ﬁ” reads as “presupposes”:
(6) I was glad that I saw Andreasﬁ ‘I saw Andreas’ is true.
Emotive factives indeed give rise to this pattern, hence we can generalize that pu
complements express propositions whose truth is presupposed, i.e. is part of the
background discourse assumptions. That the truth of the complement here is
a presupposition is further evidenced by the fact that it survives under negation
(see Gamut 1990 for a discussion of the tests distinguishing entailments from
15
presuppositions):
(7) ∆εν χρηκα που εδα τον Αντρα.
δen xarika pu iδa ton andrea.
‘I wasn’t glad that I saw Andreas’ﬁ ‘I saw Andreas’ is true.
Oti/pos clauses, on the other hand, may denote true propositions (see 2.2.3), but
the truth is not presupposed. If I remember, or said that I saw Andreas, unless
I am lying, it is true that I saw Andreas. But the truth inference is an entailment
and not a presupposition as the negation test reveals; unlike pu- clauses, the
truth of oti clauses does not survive under negation:
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(8) ∆εν {επα /θυµθηκα} τι εδα τον Αντρα.
δen {ipa / θimiθika} oti iδa ton andrea.
‘I didn’t {say/remember} that I saw Andreas’ﬁ/ I saw Andreas.
The pu version of the sentence with δen θimiθika ‘didn’t remember’ gives us the
expected pattern in (9a) and means what we see in (9b): ‘It is true that I saw
Andreas, but I don’t remember it’. (This representation is reminiscent of
Varlokosta’s 1994 suggestion that factive verbs and their complements form
<LINK "gia-r64">
paratactic rather than subordinating structures).
(9) a. ∆εν θυµθηκα που εδα τον Αντρα.     
δen θimiθika pu iδa ton andrea ﬁ I saw Andreas.
b. saw (I, Andreas) Ÿ ¬ remember (I, saw (I, Andreas))
So the pu clause is interpreted outside the scope of negation. In Giannakidou
16
(1998:235–236) it is suggested that this indicates that the pu clause undergoes
LF-movement past negation. Oti clauses, by contrast, can stay in situ and be
interpreted inside the scope of negation.
Christidis notes some problems with the strict presuppositional analysis of
pu. Verbs like ksero ‘know’, for instance, seem to presuppose their truth, even
when they select oti complements (Christidis 1982:118–119), as illustrated below:
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(10) Η Aριδνη ξρει τι η γη εναι στρογγυλ.
i ariaδni kseri oti i ji ine strogili
‘Ariadne knows that the earth is round.’ﬁ The earth is round.
(11) Η Aριδνη εναι µικρ και δεν ξρει ακµη τι η γη εναι
i ariaδni ine mikri ke δen kseri akomi oti i ji ine
στρογγυλ.
strogili
‘Ariadne is little and she doesn’t know yet that the earth is round.’
ﬁ The earth is round.
Hence we cannot maintain that only pu complements presuppose truth.
Clearly, a successful description of the diﬀerence between pu and oti comple-
ments cannot be made unless we consider the semantics of the embedding
predicates. Truth is preserved with ksero ‘know’ because this verb licenses
‘strong’ truth inferences, but θimame ‘remember’ allows only a ‘weaker’ truth
inference. This diﬀerence can be formally stated in terms of weak and strong
veridicality, as argued in Giannakidou (1999): a sentence of the form x kseri p
‘x knows p’ entails that p is true both with respect to the one who knows, x, and
the speaker; but with x θimate p ‘x remembers p’ the second inference is not
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valid— xmay remember as true something that the speaker considers false (for
more discussion see 2.2.2). Christidis appeals to the notion of (in)directness
which, however, is less amenable to a formal description.
I consider next the issue of mood selection. We will revisit factivity and the
diﬀerences between pu and na clauses as a subpart of that discussion.
2.2 Mood selection in complement clauses
Mood selection in main and complement clauses has been among the most
treated topics in Greek semantics, and numerous studies contain discussions of
it: inter alia, Christidis (1983), Veloudis & Philippaki-Warburton (1983),
<LINK "gia-r9">65">
Philippaki-Warburton & Veloudis (1984), Veloudis (1983/4), Rouchota (1994),
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Giannakidou (1994, 1997, 1998). In (12), (13), and (14) we see the basic classiﬁ-
16
cation; every approach, essentially, has attempted to provide an explanation for it.
(12) Verbs selecting the indicative (oti/pu clauses)
assertives: λω leo ‘say’, ισχυρζοµαι isxirizome ‘claim’
ﬁction verbs: ονειρεupsilonacuteοµαι onirevome ‘dream’, φαντζοµαι fandazome
‘imagine’
epistemics: πιστεupsilonacuteω pistevo ‘believe’, νοµζω nomizo ‘think’
factives: χαροµαι xerome ‘be glad’, γνωρζω γnorizo ‘know’, µετανι$νω
metanjono ‘regret’
semifactives: ανακαλupsilonacuteπτω anakalipto ‘discover’, θυµµαι θimame
‘remember’
(13) Verbs selecting the subjunctive (na clauses)
volitionals: θλω θelo ‘want’, ελπζω elpizo ‘hope’, σκοπεupsilonacuteω skopevo ‘plan’
directives: διατζω δjatazo ‘order’, συµβουλεupsilonacuteω simvulevo ‘advise’,
πρoτενω protino ‘suggest’
modals: (invariant) πρπει prepi ‘must’ (deontic and epistemic), εναι
{δυνατν/πιθανν} ine {δinaton/piθanon} ‘it is possible’
permissives: επιτρπω epitrepo ‘allow’
negative: αποφεupsilonacuteγω apofevγo ‘avoid’, αρνοupsilonacuteµαι arnume ‘refuse’, απα-
γορεupsilonacuteω apaγorevo ‘forbid’
verbs of fear: φοβµαι fovame ‘be afraid’
The subjunctive is also selected by verbs like the ones below:
(14) aspectual: αρχζω arxizo ‘start’, συνεχζω sinexizo ‘continue’
perception: βλπω vlepo ‘see’, ακοupsilonacuteω akuo ‘hear’
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commissives: αναγκζοµαι anagazome ‘be forced’, υπσχοµαι iposxome
‘promise’
implicatives: καταφρνω kataferno ‘ manage’
There are also cases of ‘double’ mood selection. For example, epistemic verbs
like pistevo ‘believe’and ksero ‘know’ can occasionally take na-complements,
factives may select na-clauses when they do not refer to facts, and perception
verbs are found with oti, pu- complements too.2 With perception verbs, mood
choice is determined by whether perception is direct or indirect. In the former
case, the subjunctive is used; in the case of the latter, one has to use the indica-
tive (see Christidis 1983; Philippaki-Warburton & Veloudis 1984). Mood shifts
<LINK "gia-r9">50">
are pervasive in Romance too (see e.g. Farkas 1985 and Quer 1998); sometimes
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negation of an indicative verb alone suﬃces to trigger subjunctive in the
complement, a phenomenon interesting in itself, but only marginally attested
in Greek (see Philippaki-Warburton & Veloudis 1984: fn. 4, p.161), and
Giannakidou (1995), from which the following example is taken:
6
(15) a. Νοµζω {*να ρθει / τι θα ρθει} ο Γιννης.
nomizo {*na erθi / oti θa erθi} o janis
think-1sg {*subj come-3sg that fut come-3sg the John
‘I think that John will come.’
b. ∆εν νοµζω {να ρθει / τι θα ρθει} ο Γιννης.
δen nomizo {na erθi / oti θa erθi} o janis
not think-1sg {subj come-3sg that fut come-3sg the John
‘I don’t think that John will come.’
In the light of such facts one might view the subjunctive as a polarity item (as
Giannakidou 1995 does).
2.2.1 Earlier approaches
The basic question is what the semantic factor is that regulates mood choice.
Traditional grammars tend to describe the diﬀerence as a contrast between
realis (indicative) and irrealis (subjunctive). Yet a mere look at the types of
predicates involved suggests that this cannot be the intended formal distinction:
irrealis verbs, like pistevo, ‘believe’, nomizo ‘think’ and onirevome ‘dream’ select
the indicative and not the subjunctive; and conversely, obvious realis verbs
meaning ‘see’, ‘start’, and ‘manage’ select the subjunctive and not the indicative.
Christidis (1983) proposes that the diﬀerence between the subjunctive and
the indicative should be understood in terms of transient (subjunctive) versus
permanent (indicative) properties. This would explain why the subjunctive is
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used with the aspectual class of verbs which indicate change, but it raises,
among others, the problem of how to understand the complement of verbs like
believe and dream as denoting ‘permanent’ states.
Veloudis & Philippaki-Warburton (1983), and Philippaki-Warburton &
<LINK "gia-r65">50
Veloudis (1984) propose instead that the diﬀerence can be explained by
appealing to extensionality and intensionality: subjunctive verbs are intensional,
but indicative verbs are extensional. The contrast in question is the one from
classical intensional logic. Intensional verbs introduce a set of possible worlds
and their complements must be evaluated with respect to that set. With
extensional verbs, on the other hand, we do not consider other worlds, but only
the actual one, w0. This diﬀerence explains why substitution of coreferential
terms salva veritate holds only in extensional contexts:
(16) Principle of Extensionality
In any situation where s and t are referential expressions, and s= t, the
following holds: [t/s] φ´ φ
If expressions s and t refer to the same individual, in an extensional context we
can substitute them salva veritate. In intensional contexts this cannot be done,
as we see below:
(17) a. John hit Frank.
b. Frank is Mary’s husband.
c.\John hit Mary’s husband.
(18) a. John wants to hit Frank.
b. Frank is Mary’s husband.
c. Not necessarily: John wants to hit Mary’s husband.
From the two premises in (18) we cannot conclude c. This is so because Frank
happens to be the individual satisfying the description ‘husband of Mary’ in the
actual world w0, but in another world w1 this may not be the case: the husband
of Mary may be another individual in w1, say Paul. So, the fact that verbs like
want make us consider possible worlds creates opacity. This opacity is not
observed with extensional verbs like ‘hit’, as only the actual world w0 is taken
into consideration, and Frank is Mary’s husband in w0.
Appealing to formally well-understood notions like intensionality and
extensionality is certainly on the right track, and, additionally, it embeds the
discussion of Greek in the general discussion ofmood choice in other languages,
where such tools have been standardly employed (see, for example Farkas
13
1985). Yet empirical problems arise with the position that subjunctive verbs are
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intensional, and indicative ones extensional. The most important obstacle
seems to be that verbs meaning believe, think and dream select the indicative,
although they are standardly intensional in the classical literature (Hintikka
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1962, 1969; Quine 1953).3 Second, the verbs in (14) are extensional, but they
53
select the subjunctive. It is diﬃcult to see how these two cases can be handled to
ﬁt the proposed pattern. Essentially, the problem here is parallel to the one that
plagues the realis versus irrealis approaches.
Veloudis (1987) seems to abandon the intensionality approach, and,
65
focussing on na, suggests a reformulation of the subjunctive in terms of the
notion of ‘directness’. “Na indicates lack of directness” in this view (Veloudis
1987:294)4; the lack of directness is also used to explain the future orientation
of sentences with na (Veloudis 1987:296). Although ‘directness’ is never
actually deﬁned, it seems correct to paraphrase it as ‘belonging to the actual
world’. Hence the claim is that when na applies to a verb form, it creates a
situation which cannot at the time of utterance be perceived as belonging to the
actual world, but may be at some time in the future. In this sense, directness
looks like a variant of intensionality, and as such, it inherits the problems faced
by the latter, that I just mentioned; but it additionally obscures the relevant
distinctions, since the notion remains formally vague. Moreover, the connec-
tion to the future presents empirical problems. For instance, contrary to what
directness would lead us to expect, verbs of direct perception in fact select
na-complements, and the claim that na complements have future orientation
does not seem to hold generally: na is construed with certain nonveridical
connectives like prin ‘before’, isos ‘perhaps’ and xoris ‘without’, without yielding
future interpretations in all cases (see Giannakidou & Zwarts to appear):
(19) a. Ο Παupsilonacuteλος σως να {γρψει/γραψε} να ρθρο.
o pavlos isos na {γrapsi/eγrapse} ena arθro
the Paul perhaps subj {write-3sg/wrote-3sg an article
‘Paul perhaps will write an article.’
‘Paul wrote an article perhaps.’
b. …{χωρς / πριν} να γρψει να ρθρο.
…{xoris / prin} na γrapsi ena arθro
…{without before subj write-3sg an article
‘…without writing an article.’
‘…before writing an article.’
Here, future readings may arise with isos ‘perhaps’, but in (19a) future orienta-
tion depends not onna, but on the tense followingna. Likewise, future orientation
234 Anastasia Giannakidou
in (19b) arises only if the semantics of the particles allow it; xoris ‘without’ will
not yield future readings because xoris itself has no future meaning, but with
prin ‘before’ future orientation is licensed by the semantics of this connective,
as we see below (from Giannakidou & Zwarts to appear).
(20) [[A PRIN B]] is true iﬀ $t $t¢ A(t) Ÿ B(t¢) Ÿ t< t¢
According to this semantics, the time of the prin clause (B) follows the time of
the main clause (A), hence B is future with respect to A. Future readings with
na, then, can be seen as a consequence of the semantics of the connective and
not an inherent contribution of na itself. Likewise, the na complement of a verb
like θelo ‘want’ or protino ‘suggest’ will have future interpretation, but the na
complement of a verb like vlepo ‘see’ will not.
To sum up, we saw that none of the approaches discussed in this section enables
a complete and unproblematic characterization of the semantic factor regulat-
ingmood choice. In the next section, I present the account based on the notion
of (non)veridicality, which seems to be more successful in achieving this goal.
2.2.2 (Non)veridicality in the semantics of mood
In a series of works, Giannakidou (1994, 1995, 1998, 1999) proposed an account
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of mood choice based on the notion of (non)veridicality. This account incorpo-
rates the insights of the intensionality-based and the (ir)realis approaches, but
avoids the empirical problems of these by acknowledging a divide within the
class of intensional verbs based on the availability of at least one truth inference.
If an intensional verb allows such an inference, then it will be veridical and
select the indicative; if not, it will be nonveridical and select the subjunctive.
(Non)veridicality is deﬁned in Montague (1969) in terms of existence, but
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in Giannakidou’s work it is formalized based on truth inferences (see also
Zwarts 1995). (There is of course, and intuitive connection between existence
6
and truth which becomes relevant in the discussion of mood choice in relative
clauses in 3.1).
(21) DEFINITION 1 (Relativized (non)veridicality for propositional operators)
[Giannakidou 1999:388]
Let c= ·cg(c), W(c), M, s, h, w0, f,…Ò be a context.
i. A propositional operator Op is veridical iﬀ it holds that: [[Op p]]c=1
Æ [[p]]=1 in some epistemic model ME(x)Œ c; otherwise Op is non-
veridical.
ii. A nonveridical operator Op is antiveridical iﬀ it holds that:
[[Op p]]c=1Æ [[p]]=0 in some epistemic model ME(x)Œ c.
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A propositional operator is veridical iﬀ the truth ofOp p in c requires that p be
true in some individual’s epistemic model M(x) in c. If the truth of Op p in c
does not require that p be true in some such model in c, Op is nonveridical. A
nonveridical operator Op is antiveridical iﬀ the truth of Op p in c requires that
p be false in some epistemic model M(x) in c. Antiveridical operators are
essentially negative operators and they form a proper subset of the nonveridical
(antiveridical Ã nonveridical).
Relativization of (non)veridicality with respect to epistemic models is
motivated by the need to deal with the veridicality properties of propositional
attitudes. Models are construed as sets of worlds relative to an individual:
(22) DEFINITION 2 (Models of individuals).
Let c= ·cg(c), W(c), M, s, h, w0, f,…Ò be a context.
A model M(x) ŒM is a set of worlds associated with an individual x. x is
the individual anchor.
An epistemicmodel is a set of words compatible with what x believes. The term
individual anchor is borrowed from Farkas (1992). The idea is that sentences are
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not true or false in isolation, but with respect to some individual. Before we
consider propositional attitudes, let me illustrate how (non)veridicality works
for the simple cases.
Adverbs like xθes ‘yesterday’, are typical examples of veridical operators.
(23) Χθες, ο Παupsilonacuteλος εδε να φδι. Æ Ο Παupsilonacuteλος εδε να φδι.
xθes o pavlos iδe ena ﬁδi
‘Yesterday, Paul saw a snake.’ Æ Paul saw a snake.
The veridicality of yesterday relates to the past tense, which is also veridical.
Logical conjunction is veridical too, in both argument positions (Zwarts 1995).
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In the absence of embedding, the individual anchor is the speaker and the truth
entailment holds in his/her model of evaluation (not indicated here because no
other model is available).
Typical nonveridical operators are: the question operator, modal verbs,
modal adverbs like isos ‘perhaps’ and piθanon ‘possibly’, and future oriented
adverbs and particles. Likewise, temporal connectives like prin and its counter-
part before are nonveridical. Again, the model of evaluation is the speaker’s,
since we are dealing with unembedded sentences:
(24) Εδε ο Παupsilonacuteλος να φδι; Æ/ Ο Παupsilonacuteλος εδε να φδι.
iδe o pavlos ena ﬁδi
‘Did Paul see a snake?’ Æ/ Paul saw a snake.
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(25) Μπορε ο Παupsilonacuteλος να εδε να φδι. Æ/ Ο Παupsilonacuteλος εδε να φδι.
bori o pavlos na iδe ena ﬁδi
‘Paul may have seen a snake.’ Æ/ Paul saw a snake.
(26) -σως ο Παupsilonacuteλος να εδε να φδι. Æ/ Ο Παupsilonacuteλος εδε να φδι.
isos o pavlos na iδe ena ﬁδi
‘Perhaps Paul saw a snake.’ Æ/ Paul saw a snake.
(27) Πιθανν ο Παupsilonacuteλος να εδε να φδι.
piθanon o pavlos na iδe ena ﬁδi Æ/ Ο Παupsilonacuteλος εδε να φδι.
‘Paul possibly saw a snake.’ Æ/ Paul saw a snake.
(28) Ο Παupsilonacuteλος φυγε πριν (να) ρθει η Αριδνη.
o pavlos eﬁje prin (na) erθi i ariaδni
Æ/ .ρθε η Αριδνη.
‘Paul left before Ariadne came.’ Æ/ Ariadne came.
We see here that na-selecting particles, modal verbs, adverbs and connectives
are nonveridical. With temporal adverbials and connectives, the nonveridicality
inference will have to be further constrained with respect to times, but I will not
consider this issue here (see Giannakidou and Zwarts to appear). The fact that
na-clauses are licensed by nonveridical elements allows us to formulate the
hypothesis that na is triggered by nonveridicality.
Negation and without are typical antiveridical operators; again, in un-
embedded cases only the speaker’s model is available.
(29) Ο Παupsilonacuteλος δεν φυγε. Æ ∆εν εναι αλθεια τι ο Παupsilonacuteλος φυγε.
o pavlos δen eﬁje
‘Paul did not leave.’ Æ It is not the case that Paul left.
(30) …χωρς να φupsilonacuteγει ο Παupsilonacuteλος.
…xoris na ﬁji o pavlos
Æ ∆εν εναι αλθεια τι ο Παupsilonacuteλος φυγε.
‘…without Paul leaving.’ Æ It is not the case that Paul left.
Antiveridical operators are intuitively ‘negative’, and are also compatible with
na, as we see in (30); recall also that negation triggers na in example (15b).
Going back to the mood distinction in propositional attitudes, we see that
veridicality enables us to unify the group of indicative-selecting verbs as a
natural class. Consider, for instance, pistevo ‘believe’ and its ilk. These verbs
express relations between individuals and propositions, for which it holds that
the main clause subject is committed to the truth of the embedded proposition.
Though the speaker might disagree, a prerequisite for p to be true in (31) is that
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Jacob’s epistemic model be a subset of the worlds where p is true: ME(Jacob) Õ
p, i.e. Jacob must be committed to Ariadne loves Paul if he believes it. The
speaker may believe or even know that what Jacob believes is false, but this is
irrelevant for Jacob’s beliefs.
(31) [[Jacob believes that Ariadne loves Paul]]c=1 iﬀ [[Ariadne loves
Paul]]ME(Jacob)=1
Hence, believe is veridical according to our deﬁnition: [[pistevo (su, p]] c=1Æ
[[p]]MB(su)=1. The same holds for think, imagine, dream (where the dream
worlds replace the actual world), assertive verbs, and of course factives, where
an additional veridical inference is derived with respect to the speaker’s model
too. In the case of factives, then, it may be appropriate to talk about strong
veridicality (for more details see Giannakidou 1998, 1999).
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The subjunctive-selecting verbs in (13), on the other hand, are non-
veridical. Consider θelo ‘want’. Intuitively, “wanting something is preferring it
to certain relevant alternatives, the relevant alternatives being those possibilities
that the agent believes will be realized if he does not get what he wants.”
(Stalnaker 1984:89). The anchoring model here is the subject’s epistemic model
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which may be seen as including worlds representing future realizations of the
actual world, designated as MEfut(su) — though desires can also be about the
past, but I ignore these cases here as they do not seem to alter the overall
picture. MEfut(su) is partitioned into two sets, say W1 and W2. W1 includes
worlds in which p is true, so the following holds: "w¢, w¢ŒW1 and
W1ÃMEfut(su), [[p]]=1 in w¢, therefore W1 Õ p. W2, the complement of W1,
contains worlds where p is false:"w≤, w≤ŒW2 andW2ÃMEfut(su), [[p]]=0 in
w≤, therefore W2«p=Ø. The worlds in W1 are more desired alternatives than
the worlds in W2, but still, from want (su, p) we cannot infer that p is true in
MEfut(su). We can also not infer that the actual world w0will be a member of
W1, the set of worlds where p is true.
(32) [[θelo (su, p)]]c=1Æ/ [[p]]MEfut(su)=1 ‘want’
A similar analysis can be given for the semantics of the other subjunctive-taking
attitude verbs in (13). We may conclude, therefore, that (non)veridicality
describes successfully the indicative versus subjunctive split in Greek. The
crosslinguistic picturemay be somewhatmore complicated (cf. Quer 1998), but
2
(non)veridicality certainly presents a necessary, if not the only, ingredient for
the characterization of mood.
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What about the verbs in (14)? Are aspectual, perception, and implicative
verbs nonveridical? The answer is no. If I start doing p then p is true, if I see
Mary p thenMary p is also true, and likewise, if I manage to p, p is true in some
model, hence these verbs are veridical. One way to handle the contrast is to
assume that na is in fact ambiguous between a veridical and a nonveridical
function (as proposed in Giannakidou 1994b). Such amovemight be indepen-
<LINK "gia-r16">
dently motivated: as a veridical particle, complement na is close in meaning to
deictic na; additionally, veridical na, in certain cases, can be replaced by the
veridical conjunction ke ‘and’:
(33) Κατφερε και αγρασε να σπτι.
katafere ke aγorase ena spiti
managed-3sg and bought-3sg a house
‘He managed to buy a house.’
There are further syntactic diﬀerences distinguishing veridical na complements
from nonveridical ones which I will not discuss here, but have been noted in the
literature (see Terzi 1992; Varlokosta 1994; Holton et al. 1997). I will brieﬂy
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mention two: (a) typically, the null subject in veridical na clauses is obligatorily
bound by the matrix subject, but the subjects of nonveridical na-clauses do not
exhibit this characteristic:
(34) Θλω να {φupsilonacuteγω/φupsilonacuteγει ο Παupsilonacuteλος}.
θelo na {ﬁγo/ﬁji o pavlos}
want-1sg subj {go-1sg/go-3sg the Paul
‘I want to go.’/‘I want Paul to go.’
(35) Συνχισε να {χορεupsilonacuteει / *χορεupsilonacuteω}.
sinexise na {xorevi / *xorevo}
continued-3sg subj {dance-3sg *dance-1sg
‘She kept on dancing.’
b. Veridical predicates impose aspectual restrictions on their na-complements.
More speciﬁcally, some of them (i.e. the aspectual and perception verbs)
require that the VP of the complement bear imperfective aspect. Nonveridical
verbs do not pose such a requirement. The need to have imperfective aspect
after perception verbs obviously relates to the fact that the na-complements
express direct perception: among other things, the imperfective indicates the
ongoing (see discussion in Section 4.1).
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3. Polarity phenomena, negation, and negative concord
Nonveridicality and antiveridicality turn out to be central in the analysis of
polarity as well, more speciﬁcally, in the characterization of polarity contexts.
The contribution of Greek has been important in bringing forth generalizations
which have far-reaching crosslinguistic implications. I consider polarity
phenomena in Sections 3.1, 3.2; the related issues of negation and negative
concord are discussed in 3.3.
3.1 Varieties of polarity
Polarity is a phenomenon widely attested across languages; the pattern involves
expressions which occur only in sentences exhibiting some particular semantic
characteristic.
(36) a. I didn’t see anybody.
b. Did you see anybody?
c. John may talk to anybody.
d. *I saw anybody.
Expressions like English any are traditionally known as polarity items (PIs): they
are ungrammatical in positive sentences, but are ﬁne inter alia in negative
sentences, questions, and with modal verbs, as we see. PIs are not uniform, but
come in diﬀerent varieties (all of which fall under deﬁnition 3 below). In Greek,
four classes of PIs can be identiﬁed (Giannakidou 1998): two negation related
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PIs — “aﬀective” in Klima’s (1964) terminology, free choice items (FCIs), and
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mood alternation in relative clauses. Aﬀective PIs will be discussed in the next
subsection. Examples of FCIs are items of the opjosδipote paradigm:
(37) οποιοσδποτε opjosδipote anyone, anybody, whoever
ο,τιδποτε otiδipote anything, whatever
οποτεδποτε opoteδipote any time, whenever
οπουδποτε opuδipote any place, wherever
FCIs are ungrammatical in positive veridical and negative sentences with
perfective aspect. They typically occur in nonnegative nonveridical contexts
allowing for variation, e.g. intensional, habitual, generic, and modal sentences:
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(38) *(∆εν) εδα οποιονδποτε.
*(δen) iδa opjonδipote
(not saw-perf-1sg any-person
‘*I didn’t see whoever.’
‘* I saw whoever.’
(39) Οποιοσδποτε φοιτητς µπορε να λupsilonacuteσει αυτ το πρβληµα.
opjosδipote ﬁtitis bori na lisi afto to provlima
any student can subj solve-3sg this the problem
‘Any student can solve this problem.’
The sentence (39) has a ﬂavor of arbitrariness implying that identity is not
important: any student we consider, it doesn’t matter who the student might be,
will have the ability to solve this problem. Hence statements like (39) give the
impression of universal-like meaning; Giannakidou (1998, 2000a), however,
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argues that FCIs are not universal quantiﬁers but intensional indeﬁnites. A
variety of the properties of FCIs (such as plural interpretation, incompatibility
with perfective aspect, and the distribution in intensional, modal and habitual
contexts) can be made to follow from this hypothesis.
Mood alternation in relative clauses is discussed in Veloudis (1983/84),
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Rouchota (1994), Quer (1998) and Giannakidou (1998), where it is embedded
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into the theory of polarity. The basic fact concerns the possibility of having na
in the relative clause modifying an indeﬁnite NP:
(40) ΗΜαρα θλει να παντρευτε ναν ντρα που (να) χει πολλ
i maria θeli na pandrefti enan andra pu (na) exi pola
λεφτ.
lefta
‘Mary wants to marry a man who has a lot of money.’
The English translation of the sentence is ambiguous between the two readings
we see in (41) and (42). Under the reading in (41), the indeﬁnite a man who has
a lot of money is interpreted inside the scope of the intensional verb want, and
the existence of a man that will meet the description conveyed by the NP
modiﬁed by the relative clause is not warranted. Under the reading in (42), on
the other hand, the existence of such a man is given in the actual world, because
a man who has a lot of money is interpreted outside the scope of want:
(41) WANT (Maria, ($x [man (x) Ÿ has-a-lot-of-money (x) Ÿmarry
(Maria,x)]))
(42) $x [man (x)Ÿ has-a-lot-of-money (x)ŸWANT (Maria,marry (Maria,x))]
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In Greek, the ambiguity is resolved bymood choice (and similarly in Romance,
see Farkas 1985; and for a more recent discussion Quer 1998). If the relative
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clause modifying enan andra ‘a man’ contains na, the sentence receives the
narrow scope interpretation (41); if na is absent, enan andra ‘a man’ has only
the wide scope reading in (42). Hence subjunctive relatives and their indicative
counterparts are PIs: their distribution is regulated by whether existence infer-
ences are available (indicative relatives) or not (subjunctive relatives); for more
discussion on this point see Giannakidou (1998:85–92). As expected, subjunc-
6
tive modiﬁcation is disallowed with extensional verbs, as these imply existence.
At a general level, the semantic property that licenses PIs has been the
object of a long debate which focussed almost exclusively on any. Baker (1970)
6">
argues that the crucial semantic property is negation (hence the term ‘negative
PI’), Linebarger (1980) proposes an extension based on negative implicature,
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Horn (1972) and Fauconnier (1975) argue for a generalization based on scale
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reversal, and Ladusaw (1979) proposes a formal semantic account postulating
that PIs are acceptable only in the scope of expressions which denote downward
entailing (DE) functions. Unlike upward entailing (UE) functions, which are
order preserving, DE functions are order reversing, hence expressions denoting
such functions support inference from sets to subsets, e.g. negation:
(43) Lucy does not like ice cream.
Italian ice cream Õ ice cream
\Lucy does not like Italian ice cream.
In positive sentences, on the other hand, we get UE inferences, we can thus
replace expressions denoting subsets with expressions denoting super-sets: Lucy
likes Italian ice cream implies that Lucy likes ice cream, but not the reverse. PIs
are excluded from UE contexts.
Giannakidou (1993, 1997, 1998, 1999) shows that such approaches fail as
general theories of polarity, because there are polarity environments which are
not strictly speaking negative, scale reversing, or DE, inter aliamodal verbs and
questions. The argument is supported by a closer investigation of Greek,
English, Dutch, and other languages (e.g. Russian, Romanian; see Haspelmath
1997 for extensive data). The investigation makes clear that nonveridicality is
the formal semantic property shared by polarity contexts:
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(44) DEFINITION 3 (Polarity item).
A linguistic expression α is a polarity item iﬀ:
(i) The distribution of α is limited by sensitivity to some semantic prop-
erty β of the context of appearance; and
(ii) β is (non)veridicality, or a subproperty there of.
Negative and DE operators are proper subsets of the nonveridical, hence the
deﬁnition above allows for sensitivity to negation or DE under themore general
case of sensitivity to nonveridicality. It is not the purpose here to give detailed
analyses of all the relevant cases; for the reminder of this section I will concen-
trate on the cases that have attracted most attention in the literature.
3.2 Aﬀective polarity
Greek has the two negation-related (‘aﬀective’) PI-paradigms we see below,
which are distinguished by means of emphatic accent, as ﬁrst observed in
Veloudis (1982):
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Uppercase letters indicate emphatic accent, not related to focus for reasons
discussed in Giannakidou (1997, 1998:227–231); see, however, Tsimpli &
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Roussou (1996) for a focus-based syntactic proposal. (The semantic part of
Tsimpli & Roussou’s proposal, namely that nonemphatic items are licensed by
modality, is in agreement with the earlier analysis in Giannakidou (1993),
where this is proposed and which can be seen as a variant of the nonveridicality
hypothesis). I follow here Giannakidou (1998, 2000b) in assuming that
emphatics are lexically distinct (but Veloudis 1982; Giannakidou 1997; Gian-
nakidou & Quer 1995, 1997 treat them as one paradigm). Emphatic accent,
then, is equivalent to morphological marking, which is not a ‘peculiarity’
speciﬁc to PIs, but a strategy employed elsewhere in the grammar of Greek (e.g.
in order to distinguish between LIJI ‘few’ and liji ‘a few’, and POLI ‘too’ versus
poli ‘very’). Using suprasegmental features for morphological distinctions is
quite common across languages, typical exponents being tone or stress (e.g.,
pérmit (noun) versus permít (verb) in English).
Emphatic and nonemphatic PIs must be construed with negation or xoris
‘without’ in order to be grammatical, but nonemphatics are also licensed in a
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broad array of nonnegative environments including inter alia, modal verbs,
interrogatives, imperatives, and the scope of nonveridical verbs like θelo ‘want’
and elpizo ‘hope’. Emphatic items are ungrammatical in nonnegative construc-
tions. The following examples partially illustrate this contrast:
(46) a. Η Θεοδ$ρα *(δεν) ενκρινε {καννα/KANENA} σχδιο.
i θeoδora *(δen) enekrine {kanena/KANENA} sxeδio
‘Theodora didn’t approve any plan.’
‘Theodora approved no plan.’
b. *(Χωρς) να δει {κανναν/KANENAN}…
*(xoris) na δi {kanenan/KANENAN}…
‘Without seeing anybody…’
(47) Πγες {ποτ/*ΠΟΤΕ} στο Παρσι;
pijes {pote/*POTE} sto parisi
‘Have you ever been to Paris?’
(48) Αν δεις {κανναν/*KANENAN}…
an δis {kanenan/*KANENAN}…
‘If you see anybody…’
(49) Ελπζω να µεινε {καννα/*KANENA} κοµµτι.
elpizo na emine {kanena/*KANENA} komati
‘I hope there is a piece left.”
(50) Πρε {καννα/*KANENA} µλο.
pare {kanena/*KANENA} milo
‘Take an apple.’
In these contexts, nonemphatics are interpreted as existential quantiﬁers, but
emphatics may give the impression that they are negative — an issue to be
considered shortly. The value assigned to emphatics may be viewed as ranging
upon a scale, as in Fauconnier (1975) and Horn(1972) (see Delveroudi 1989 for
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discussion in this spirit). Crucially, the contexts above are not negative or DE;
in fact it can be shown that some of them are upward entailing, or that they do
not allow inference in either direction. For example, from an imperative take an
apple we cannot infer take a red apple, nor can we infer the opposite; impera-
tives are thus non-monotone, a generalization which seems to hold for the
whole class of intensional expressions. The contexts above are nonveridical, and
the Greek PIs appear unproblematically in such contexts. Other nonveridical
environments that allow for nonemphatics but not emphatics are exclamatives,
habituals and generics, disjunctions, and the restriction of universal quantiﬁers;
as mentioned before, this holds for other languages as well as for Greek. Based
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on the observed distributional diﬀerences we can characterize nonemphatics as
aﬀective polarity items (APIs) and emphatics as negative polarity items (NPIs).
(51) DEFINITION 4 (Aﬀective polarity item)
A polarity item α is aﬀective iﬀ it is licensed by nonveridical operators.
(52) DEFINITION 5 (Negative polarity item)
An aﬀective polarity item α is a negative polarity item iﬀ it is licensed by
antiveridical operators.
“Being licensed by” raises the question of scope, and in most cases, licensing
corresponds to a condition requiring that the PI be in the scope of the licenser.
Crucially, however, licensing is a form of semantic dependency, and as such it
does not map necessarily into a syntactic be in the scope of condition. In some
cases, for instance with emphatic NPIs as we shall see below, licensing corre-
sponds to an anti-scope condition. We expect the precise scope condition to be
determined by the semantics of the PIs themselves, and more work is needed
before we understand the details of the various PI-paradigms; one question that
remains open, for example, is how to capture the intervention eﬀects of other
quantiﬁers in polarity contexts.
Besides nonemphatics, other APIs can be identiﬁed: akoma ‘still/yet’ (see
Setatos 1987), and the modal verb xriazete ‘need’. Other NPIs in Greek include
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kan ‘not even’, possibly pja ‘anymore’, and bare singulars asminimizers like leksi
‘word’ (as in δen ipe leksi ‘he didn’t say a word’). Sioupi (to appear) observes
that non-polarity bare singulars always take narrow scope with respect to other
operators in a sentence, showing an important parallel to their polarity uses.
To conclude, by invoking a notion broader than DE and negation, we are
able to construe a theory of polarity which aﬀords a much greater empirical
coverage, and provides a solid basis for the uniﬁcation of aﬀective environ-
ments as a natural class across languages. The contribution of Greek has been
very important in bringing about this result.
3.3 Negation and negative concord
Negative concord (NC) is observed in many languages, e.g. Romance, Slavic,
Hungarian, West Flemish, Afrikaans, and certain varieties of English. Broadly,
we speak of NC in situations where negation is interpreted just once although
it seems to be expressed more than once in the clause. Greek also exhibits NC:
(46a) constitutes a typical case, and I give here another example; see Veloudis’
6
(1982) seminal work on negation where construals like these were ﬁrst identiﬁed:
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(53) *(∆εν) επα ΤΙΠΟΤΑ.
*(δen) ipa TIPOTA
‘I didn’t say anything.’
We talk about NC here because TIPOTA seems to be able to convey negative
meaning as a fragment answer in the absence of sentential negation δen: Q: ti
ipes? ‘What did you say? A: TIPOTA. ‘Nothing’. (With nonemphatics the issue
of NC does not arise, as these are existentials, cf. 3.2). NC poses an obvious
puzzle for the syntax-semantics interface: if we have more than one occurrence
of negation in a clause, why do we end up interpreting only a single negation?
We do not want to give up compositionality as the principle of semantic
interpretation, nor do we wish to argue that languages with NC are less “logical”
than languages without it.
Two types of solution have been proposed in the literature. The ﬁrst takes
NC words like TIPOTA (n-words in Laka’s 1990 terminology) to be negative
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quantiﬁers which merge, with each other and sentential negation, into one
semantic negation (negative absorption). Quer (1993) proposed an account
52
along these lines for Greek. (Klidi 1994 presents a syntactic variant based on
3
Progovac’s 1994 binding analysis). Yet there is little evidence that emphatics are
1
inherently negative, and apparent cases that might indicate so, e.g. fragment
answers, are due to ellipsis (Giannakidou 1998, 2000b). Alternatively, the thesis
16
that n-words are inherently negative has been dismissed. Instead, it is argued
that in NC negation is expressed only by sentential negation and that n-words
are indeﬁnites with no quantiﬁcational force of their own (Ladusaw 1994; for
Greek Giannakidou 1997; Giannakidou & Quer 1995, 1997). Veloudis (1982)
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suggests a variant of this approach by analyzing emphatics as involving existen-
tial quantiﬁers in the scope of negation, as in (54b):
(54) Logical representations of general negative statements
a. "x [P(x)Æ ¬Q(x)] (Universal negation)
b. ¬$x [P(x) Ÿ Q(x)] (Existential negation)
In Giannakidou (1998, 2000b) it is shown that the existential/indeﬁnite analysis
is not likely to be the correct analysis for emphatics. Unlike indeﬁnites, whose
scope is unbounded, emphatics appear to obey familiar constraints on universal
quantiﬁers: their scope is generally quite local, and almost clause-bound, with
the exception of na-complements which allow scoping of universal quantiﬁers
too (for constraints on the scope of universal quantiﬁers in Greek and English
see Farkas & Giannakidou 1996). Additionally, emphatics align with universal
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quantiﬁers in a number of other crucial semantic respects, some of which I
brieﬂy illustrate below:
a. Almost/absolutely modiﬁcation."-quantiﬁers, but not $, can bemodiﬁed by
almost/absolutely.We see below that only emphatics admit almost/absolutely
modiﬁcation.
(55) a. *Electra was willing to accept {almost/absolutely} something.
b. Electra was willing to accept {almost/absolutely} everything.
c. ∆εν εδα {σχεδν /απολupsilonacuteτως} {*κανναν / KANENAN}.
δen iδa {sxeδon / apolitos} {*kanenan /KANENAN}
not saw-1sg {almost absolutely *{n-person  
‘I saw almost nobody.’
b. ke-modiﬁcation (see also Quer (1993)). Ke ‘and’ is a modiﬁer of existential
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quantiﬁers, and emphatics are incompatible with it. This expression is
comparable to Dutch ook maar, German auch nur and English even.
(56) a. 3λo και {κποιος / *καθνας} ρχεται το πρω.
olo-ke {kapjos / *kaθenas} erxete to proi
olo-ke {someone *everyone come-3sg the morning
‘Someone (usually) comes in the morning.’
b. ∆εν επε και {τποτα / *ΤΙΠΟΤΑ} σπουδαο.
δen ipe ke {tipota / *TIPOTA} spuδeo
‘He didn’t say anything important.’
c. Use as predicate nominals. On a par with universals and unlike non-
emphatics, emphatics cannot be used as predicate nominals:
(57) ∆εν εναι (και) {καννας/*KANENAΣ} γιατρς.
δen ine (ke) {kanenas/*KANENAS} jatros
‘He is no doctor.’
(58) Frank is {a/*every} friend of mine.
Partee (1987) discusses restrictions on the availability of type-shifting to
49
predicative (type ·e, tÒ) interpretations, and shows that universal quantiﬁers like
every, unlike existential indeﬁnites, cannot shift to this type and be used as
predicate nominals. The unacceptability of emphatics in predicate nominal
positions indicates clearly that emphatics are like every in this respect. Note that
He is no doctor and its Greek counterpart are not equivalent to the respective
structures with negation + indeﬁnite NP.He is no doctor can be true even if one
is a doctor, but not a good one; he is not a doctor is false in this situation.
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Additional semantic evidence that emphatics align with universals comes
from donkey anaphora and the availability of existence inferences under
negation. Giannakidou (2000b) proposes, therefore, that emphatics instantiate
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with negation a logical structure like (54a) (leaving (54b) for nonemphatics).
Unlike regular universals, however, emphatics are also NPIs, and as such they
require the presence of negation for licensing; but for the correct interpretation
of NC, they must raise and scope over negation at the level of LF. This move-
ment can be seen as an instance of quantiﬁer raising (QR), and is local just like
QR standardly is (May 1985).
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As a result of this analysis, NC need not involve a special rule in the
grammar, but it is reduced to the more familiar case of quantiﬁer scope. Given
that the usefulness of QR has been questioned recently, this analysis provides a
strong argument for retaining QR as a necessary device at the syntax-semantics
interface: we need it in order to interpret NC. As with polarity, the contribution
of Greek has been crucial in constructing this argument.
4. Other topics
In this last section, I consider topics in the syntax-semantics interface that have
received attention through the years, but which I cannot handle in more detail
due to lack of space. The issues involved, however, undoubtedly represent very
productive research paradigms with signiﬁcant theoretical implications in many
cases, and are certainly worthy of a detailed examination on their own.
4.1 Aspect, tense, and modality
Sentences refer to eventualities. Tense locates these eventualities in time by
relating their time to some other time, either to the utterance time or to the
time of another eventuality (reference time). Aspect is independent, and quite
diﬀerent from tense. Through aspectual meaning (a) we grasp what type of
eventuality we are talking about (lexical aspect or Aktionsart), and (b) we look
at the internal consistency of the eventuality (nonlexical aspect). The two are
independent, though interacting in many ways. Lexical aspect gives information
regarding the ontology of eventualities, and its source is to be found in the
lexical meaning of the verb: it tells us whether we are dealing with an event
(Frank saw Lucie), a process (Frank runs), or a state (Frank is ill).
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Nonlexical aspect encompasses the following distinctions: perfective-
imperfective, habitual-episodic, and the progressive. Languages diﬀer signiﬁcant-
ly in the nonlexical aspectual meanings they express and the grammatical
means they use to express them. Slavic and Greek have obligatory perfective/
imperfective marking on verbal morphology, but the Germanic languages do
not (there is a massive literature on this issue; see Comrie 1976, and references
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therein). The Greek verb exhibits the following four combinations, imper-
fective nonpast (INP), perfective nonpast (PNP), imperfective past (IP), and
perfective past (PP):
(59) a. γraf- -o (INP)
write.imperf -1sg.nonpast  
‘I am writing (right now).’
‘I write (generally).’
b. γrap- s- -o (PNP)
write- perf -1sg.nonpast  
[no English equivalent]
(60) a. e- γraf- -a (IP)
past- write.imperf -1sg.past  
‘I used to write.’
‘I was writing.’
b. e- γrap- s- -a (PP)
past- write- perf -1sg.past  
‘I wrote.’
The primary goal of studying the tense-aspect system of Greek is to describe the
precise semantic content of these verbal forms, and the ensuing conditions on
their use. At a basic level, PP sentences denote events that have taken place at
some point in time, and the imperfective forms are ambiguous between
habitual/generic and progressive interpretations. Newton (1979), Newton &
46
Veloudis (1980a,b) present a characterization of the aspectual contrast in
interaction withmodal verbs employing formalism from tense semantics (using
tense variables, see especially Newton 1979). The relative scope of aspect and
modality is also examined in order to account for aspect preferences in cases
where both aspects are allowed; in more recent studies, the perfective-imper-
fective distinction has been reformulated in event semantics (Giannakidou
1996; Giannakidou & Zwarts 1999, to appear). The latter also examine the
interaction between tense/aspect and polarity, and the semantics of temporal
connectives such as molis ‘as soon as’, otan ‘when’, and prin ‘before’. Addition-
ally, Giannakidou & Zwarts (to appear) explain the impossibility of the PNP as
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a free standing form as a polarity eﬀect: PNP events cannot be located in the
present since there are no perfective present events (this is a crosslinguistic
fact); consequently, PNP is a genuinely nonveridical form occurring only with
nonveridical particles and connectives.6 Giannakidou & Merchant (1997)
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further discuss the interaction of aspect with donkey anaphora. Finally, the
relation between NP-interpretation and genericity has been addressed in
Condoravdi (1989, 1992). In the former, the emphasis is on middle construc-
1
tions like To krasi pinete efxarista ‘This wine drinks easily’ which are shown to
be generic; this analysis is adopted in Sioupi (1998), where it is further shown
5
that middles without adverbials, e.g. To nero afto pinete ‘This water is drinkable’
involve a hidden modal, cf. English -able.
Lexical aspect is discussed in Mozer (1994); Hila-Markopoulou & Mozer
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(to appear) further examine the interaction of lexical aspect and NPs within the
VP; they suggest that the referentiality of NP-complements is related to the
telicity of the verb predicate. Giannakidou &Merchant (1999) address the role
of lexical aspect in constraining syntactic secondary predicates in resultative
constructions. They attempt to explain why Greek lacks the productive strategy
that English employs, illustrated in the example below:
(61) Η Αριδνη πτισε τα φυτ (*εππεδα).
i ariaδni potise ta ﬁta (*epipeδa)
the Ariadne watered-3sg the plants (*ﬂat
‘Ariadne watered the plants (ﬂat).’
Resultative constructions involve complex event structures: they comprise a
process, in this case Ariadne’s watering, which leads to a result, in this case the
plants being ﬂat, provided by the secondary predicate in English. Greek, unlike
English, employs productively certain verbal aﬃxes, e.g. -izo, -ono, -evo, -pio,
etc, and, according to Giannakidou & Merchant (1999) the result argument is
provided already by those aﬃxes. Hence there is no need to employ a secondary
predicate, since only one result is allowed per structure (Tenny 1987). Similarly,
8
when English employs a resultative aﬃx, e.g. -ify, resultative secondary predi-
cates are disallowed, as in *The teacher simpliﬁed the exercise easy.
Two more studies are noteworthy with respect to the semantics of aspect:
Tzevelekou (1995), which presents a rather detailed description of lexical and
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non-lexical aspect in Greek, and Veloudis (1992), which looks contrastively at
tense, aspect and modality systems.
Tense is discussed in most of the above-mentioned studies. In addition,
Veloudis (1989) discusses the Greek perfect, and Iatridou, Anagnostopoulou &
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Izvorsky (to appear) remark on the availability of a universal reading for the
perfect, i.e. the reading that usually arises with perfects of stative verbs in
English, illustrated below:
(62) a. I have been sick since 1990.
b. $i [begin (i)=1990 Ÿ nowŒ i Ÿ "tŒi (sick (I, at t))]
According to this reading, there is an interval starting in 1990 which includes
now, and I have been sick at every instance of time included in that interval.
(Existential readings, i.e. that I have been sick at some instance(s) in that
interval are of course also available.). Iatridou et al. claim that this reading is not
available with Greek statives, but the claim does not seem entirely accurate. The
sentence below, with aγapo ‘love’ does have a universal reading, implying that
the love-state holds constantly through the indicated interval, including now:
(63) a. Aπ τη στιγµ που µαθα τι χει κνει για µνα, τον χω
apo ti stiγmi pu emaθa ti exi kani ja mena ton exo
αγαπσει βαθι.
aγapisi vaθia
‘Since the moment I found out what he did for me, I have loved him
deeply.’
b. $i [begin (i)=the moment I found out what he did for me Ÿ now Œ
i Ÿ "tŒi (love-deeply (I, him, at t))]
c. #Αλλ δεν τον αγαπω πια.
ala δen ton aγapao pja
‘#But I don’t love him anymore.’
The continuation in c is contradictory. This is exactly what we expect if exo
aγapisi ‘have loved’ in (63) has the designated universal reading in b.
Iatridou (2000) presents a discussion of conditional sentences, addressing
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speciﬁcally the interpretation of tense and aspect in this context. Among other
things, uses of IP in conditionals like the ones below are discussed, where both
the past and the imperfective meanings seem to be lost:
(64) Αν παιρνε αυτ το σιρπι θα γινταν καλ.
an eperne afto to siropi θa jinotan kala
if took-IP-3sg this the syrup fut become-IP-3sg well
‘If he took this syrup, he would get well.’
Iatridou notes that the sentence can be uttered as an instruction to the caretak-
er, and not necessarily as a past conditional or counterfactual. Greek conditionals
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have also been extensively described in work by Nikiforidou (1990), although
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not in a formal semantic framework.
Modal verbs have also been the object of a number of studies. Iatridou
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(1990) comments on the distinction between ability and epistemic modality
with bori ‘can’ and links the diﬀerence to the presence or absence of tense (and
agreement) in the modal verb. Giannakidou (1994, 1997) proposes an analysis
1
of Greek modals as quantiﬁers over possible worlds restricted by modal bases,
in the spirit of Kratzer (1981); the personal bori is revisited in Giannakidou
35
(2000a), and in its ability reading it is analyzed as a universal quantiﬁer over
possible worlds. More descriptive studies of Greek modals include Iakovou
(1998), and Papafragou (1998) in a relevance-theoretic framework.
8
4.2 Ellipsis
A detailed description of Greek ellipsis is found in Milapidis (1990). The topic
3
has been revived recently in a number of studies in the syntax-semantics
interface. Though Greek does not exhibit VP ellipsis, it does exhibit other kinds
of ellipsis, illustrated below:
(65) (stripping)
Η Αριδνη φυγε αλλ χι η Ζω.
i ariaδni eﬁje ala oxi i zoi [eﬁje]
the Ariadne left-3sg but not the Zoë
‘Ariadne left but not Zoë.’
(66) (gapping)
Η Αριδνη φερε λουλοupsilonacuteδια και η Ζω σοκολτες.
i ariaδni efere luluδia ke i zoi [efere] sokolates
the Ariadne brought-3sg ﬂowers and the Zoë chocolates
‘Ariadne brought ﬂowers and Zoë chocolates.’
(67) (sluicing)
Η Αριδνη αγαπει κποιον αλλ δεν ξρω
i ariaδni aγapai kapjon ala δen ksero
the Ariadne loves someone but not know-1sg
ποιον.
pjon [aγapai i ariaδni]
who
‘Ariadne loves someone but I don’t know who.’
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(68) (NP-ellipsis)
Η Αριδνη αγρασε να καινοupsilonacuteριο αυτοκνητο µλις ποupsilonacuteλησε τo
i ariaδni aγorase ena kenurjo aftokinito molis pulise to
παλι.  
paljo [aftokinito].
‘Ariadne bought a new car as soon as she sold the old one.’
There is no isomorphic mapping onto English ellipsis — e.g. NP-ellipsis is
allowed in Greek, but not in English (Giannakidou & Stavrou 1999 attribute the
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diﬀerence to the rich Greek nominal morphology, following the relevant
literature, e.g. Lobeck 1991). Greek also has indeﬁnite object drop, a phenome-
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non discussed inGiannakidou&Merchant (1996) andKeller andLapata (1999):
1
(69) Q: 5φερε ο Αντρας {µερικ/κποια/τρα/τποτα/Ø} βιβλα;
efere o andreas {merika/kapja/tria/tipota/Ø} vivlia
‘Did Andreas bring {several/some/three/any/Ø} books?’
A: Ναι, (*τα) φερε.
ne (*ta) efere [e]
yes (them brought-3sg
‘Yes, he brought {several/some/three/some/Ø} books.’
Giannakidou & Merchant argue that indeﬁnite argument drop is not VP
ellipsis. Keller & Lapata propose a DRT account further arguing that the
phenomenon is related not just to (in)deﬁniteness, but to the anaphoric status
of the involved NPs. Two things are noteworthy about the pattern in (69). First,
the answer is understood in direct relation to the quantity speciﬁed in the
question; second, the deﬁnite clitic pronoun ta is ungrammatical in the
response. This is expected, since clitic pronouns in Greek can only be linked to
referential (strong) DPs (Anagnostopoulou & Giannakidou 1995), and here the
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question introduces no such antecedent. We ﬁnd the opposite pattern in the
response to a question with a strong DP, where clitics are needed: efere o
andreas ola ta vivlia? ‘Did Andreas bring all the books?’ ne *(ta) efere ‘Yes, he
brought them.’
Giannakidou & Merchant (1998) propose an analysis of ‘reverse’ sluicing
which relies crucially on the availability of indeﬁnite null arguments in Greek.
Merchant (to appear) further discusses Greek sluicing in his general discussion
of sluicing (see also Merchant 2000). The contribution of Greek has been
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essential in bringing about novel generalizations concerning form identity in
ellipsis, which lead to the conclusion that there must be syntactic structure in
the ellipsis site. Additionally, Merchant advances the argument that ellipsis is
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licensed under semantic and not syntactic identity, and emphasizes the role of
focus. Giannakidou & Stavrou (1999), in the same spirit, postulate a condition
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based on semantic contrast as the condition governing NP-ellipsis. Finally,
Giannakidou & Stavrou distinguish NP-ellipsis syntactically and semantically
from nominalization, a type-shifting semantic operation which takes a predi-
cate as its input and yields a kind as its output (see Chierchia 1998). As a
8">
consequence of that analysis, the ambiguity of the Greek deﬁnite determiner
between a referential and a generic reading is translated into the following: in
the referential use the deﬁnite determiner denotes the uniqueness ι-operator,
but in the generic use it denotes the intensionalized nominalization operator.
4.3 Pseudoclefts and free relatives
There is a lively debate on the issue of Greek pseudoclefts and the interpretation
of free relative clauses (FRs; see Veloudis 1979; Iatridou & Varlokosta 1998; and
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Alexiadou & Giannakidou 1998, 1999). I summarize here the gist of that
discussion. Pseudoclefts are copular structures where one of the phrases
surrounding be is a wh-element (typically taken to be a FR):
(70) What John is is silly.
Wemay refer to the non-wh-part as the pivot of the pseudocleft, and to the wh-
part as the nonpivot. In Greek, nonpivots may also contain demonstratives.
Higgins (1979) argues that pseudoclefts may be predicational or speciﬁcational.
2
The two readings are illustrated below:
(71) a. John is P. Being P is silly. or, P-hood is silly (predicational)
b. John is the following: silly. (speciﬁcational)
Under the predicational reading, (70) has a subject-predicate structure, but
under the speciﬁcational reading, it can have an equative, or a list structure, as
Higgins himself argues. Higgins envisioned lists as (possibly open) sets of
individuals or properties, so (70) expresses something like {P| P is a property
that John has}={silly, …}.
Iatridou & Varlokosta (1998) argue that Greek (and also Spanish, Catalan)
lacks speciﬁcational pseudoclefts, but Veloudis (1979) andAlexiadou&Giannaki-
dou (1998, 1999) show that this is not true. The following is a typical example of a
Greek speciﬁcational pseudocleft (similar examples are found in Spanish, Catalan):
(72) {3,τι/αυτ που} φαγε ο Πτρος λη µρα τανε παττες.
{oti/afto pu} efaje o petros oli mera itane patates
{what(ever) ate-3sg the Peter all day was potatoes
‘What Peter ate all day was potatoes.’
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Alexiadou & Giannakidou, building on Higgins’ insight, analyze speciﬁcational
sentences as involving lists, and propose a formal distinction between equation
and speciﬁcation in order to capture the two main classes of speciﬁcational
sentences. Additionally, the impact of their discussion is that it provides
crosslinguistic support to the analysis of FRs as deﬁnite descriptions, and not as
universal quantiﬁers (pace Iatridou & Varlokosta 1998).
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5. Conclusions
Though the formal semantic study of Greek constitutes a relatively young
endeavor, I hope to have shown that it has given some concrete results with
clear and signiﬁcant crosslinguistic theoretical implications. Most prominently,
the results are to be seen in the areas of mood selection and complementation,
polarity, negative concord, and aspect, but the ongoing research in these and
other directions promises exciting new discoveries as well as better understand-
ing of more familiar phenomena. There is certainly reason for optimism, but it
is also useful to remember that the project is still at the beginning in many
respects— a number of topics call out for further exploration, among which we
may distinguish the following: quantiﬁcation, binding, scope, and NP interpre-
tation in the syntax-semantics interface; the varieties of ellipsis; the representa-
tion and interpretation of focus; the syntax-semantics interface of tense and
aspect, including the interpretation of tenses in conditionals and embedded
structures, and tense/aspect in narrative discourse; and the semantics of
temporal and other connectives. To these, we may add virtually unexplored
territories like wh-quantiﬁcation and the interaction with other quantiﬁers, the
syntax-semantics of relative clauses, and comparative structures. The future lies
ahead — full of challenges and opportunities.
Notes
*  I would to thank the editors of the Journal of Greek Linguistics for giving me the opportuni-
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ty to write this article and for their conﬁdence in the outcome. I would also like to thank
them, and Jason Merchant, for their most helpful comments, and the Royal Dutch Academy
of Sciences (KNAW) for ﬁnancial support. Though this presentation will most likely, in the
end, suﬀer from the usual (hopefully minor) imperfections that inevitably accompany
presentations of this kind, I hope that I have at least succeeded in my major goals: to show
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the strength and dynamics of Greek semantics, and to give a taste of how intellectually
exciting and rewarding working on semantics can be.
1.  Another step towards extending meaning beyond truth conditions is the development of
theories describing the meaning of non-assertive sentences, e.g. imperatives and interroga-
tives (see Karttunen 1977; Groenendijk & Stokhof ’s 1997 logic of interrogatives and
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references therein). In these theories, truth conditions are replaced by answerhood or
fulﬁllment conditions, and central notions of inference, e.g. entailment, are adjusted
accordingly; the discussions are cast in dynamic frameworks like the ones mentioned here.
2.  Given the quite extensive pattern of mood shifts, it is perhaps more accurate to talk about
compatibility with mood rather than exclusive mood selection. I will keep on talking about
‘selection’ with this intended meaning here. Note that, in most cases, mood shift is accompa-
nied by a meaning shift: ksero oti/pu means ‘I know that’ but ksero na means ‘I have the
ability to’ as in ksero na kolibo ‘I know how to swim’. Likewise, pistevo oti has the standard
epistemic meaning, but δen pistevo na has a directive meaning ‘I don’t expect that’ (see the
example in the text). These cases suggest that one meaning must be acknowledged as
primary, and apparently this determines the primary mood selection; the second, shifted
reading is derivable from the primary reading.
3.  Farkas 1985, 1992 introduces a distinction between strong and weak intensionality in
3
order to account for this fact. Verbs meaning believe, dream, and think are weak intensional
in her system and this means that they are evaluated with respect to one world, as opposed
to the strong intensional ones of the want-paradigmwhich are still evaluated with respect to
a set of worlds. Useful though the distinction may be, it certainly implies a radical deviance
from the standard practice in possible world semantics where all intensional predicates are
evaluated with respect to sets of worlds.
4.  Hence the subjunctive na is to be distinguished from the deictic na used in construals like
na o janis ‘Here is John!’. Deictic na does indicate directness since it requires spatio-temporal
salience (see also Christidis 1985).
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5.  Kanenas/KANENAS also appears as kanis/KANIS, but I will not consider the diﬀerences.
6.  The issue of performatives can be raised here. Interestingly, performative verbs in
utterances like aporipto ton isxirismo su oti…’I reject your claim that…’ appear in the INP,
and not the PP, although it is true that by uttering a performative sentence we actually
perform the act named by the verb. An important feature of performatives, however, is that
once the act is performed, we enter a state during which the act holds (to be ended only with
the utterance of a new performative). In this sense performatives are not simple, but complex
eventualities, comprising an event and a state whose beginning is the performance of that
event. If this is so, then imperfective aspect is expected, and performatives do not really
threaten the generalization presented here that there are no perfective present events.
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Περληψη
Το παρν ρθρο περιγρφει και εκτιµ την πορεα της «Ελληνικς Σηµασιολογας».Με τον
ρο αυτ χαρακτηρζουµε τη µελτη των σηµασιολογικ$ν φαινοµνων της Ελληνικς
γραµµατικς και του διεπιπδου σupsilonacuteνταξης και σηµασιολογας. Επισηµανονται τα θµατα
που κατ κupsilonacuteριο λγο χουν απασχολσει την ρευνα µεταξupsilonacute λλων: γκλιση,
συµπληρωµατικς προτσεις, ρνηση και πολικτητα, χρνος — ρηµατικ ψη-
τροπικτητα και λλειψη. Απ την παρουσαση καταδεικνεεται τι τα αποτελσµατα της
Ελληνικς Σηµασιολογας χουν σηµαντικς θεωρητικς συνπειες σον αφορ το γενικ
σχεδιασµ της γραµµατικς και βεβαως την ανλυση λλων γλωσσ$ν.
</TARGET "gia">
